Subic Bay is back in American planning. Although described by the crew of the USS Fulton in 1945 as “a primitive, humid, unhealthy, desolate Siberia far from the pleasant climate, facilities, and girls of Australia,” the Filipino port was an anchor of American sea power in the Pacific during the Cold War, home to the largest US naval base outside of the continental United States. The departure of American forces from Subic Bay and nearby Clark Air Base in 1992, at the request of the Philippines, closed out almost a century of military presence. Yet three decades later, Subic Bay is once again under Washington’s gaze, this time as part of the effort to counter China’s growing influence across the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific.
The latest sign of this renewed focus is the US Navy’s request to lease a 25,000-square-meter climate-controlled warehouse and maintenance facility in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, with operations slated to begin next year. According to official documents, the warehouse will be used to house vehicles and associated equipment, with space for around 60 personnel and a dedicated maintenance shop. Though modest compared to the sprawling American bases of the past, this facility is designed to plug directly into existing logistics nodes. The requirement that it be located within 10 miles of the US Marine Corps’ prepositioning site—a 57,000-square-foot depot at the former Naval Supply Depot—shows that the US military is aiming for a web of interconnected hubs rather than a single massive base. The documents also point to a sense of urgency: While an earlier solicitation in April floated the idea of a decade-long lease, the new request shortens the term to just five years, signaling Washington’s desire for flexibility and speed as it ramps up its regional posture.
That urgency is driven by the geopolitical context. Subic sits at the mouth of the Luzon Strait, a vital waterway connecting the Philippine Sea to the South China Sea and one of the most strategic maritime chokepoints in the Indo-Pacific. It is also just a short distance from contested features in the South China Sea, where Beijing has spent years building artificial islands, deploying naval and coast guard vessels, and asserting expansive territorial claims that clash with international law and Manila’s exclusive economic zone. The Philippines, a US treaty ally, has found itself on the front lines of this competition, and Subic Bay’s revival as a logistics and shipbuilding hub is central to how both Washington and Manila are responding.
At the center of Subic Bay’s rebirth is the Agila shipyard, now operated by Hyundai Heavy Industries of South Korea. Once run by Hanjin Heavy Industries, the facility collapsed into bankruptcy in 2019 despite being one of the largest shipbuilding complexes in Southeast Asia. That collapse triggered a bidding war. Chinese companies sought control, but US investment firm Cerberus Capital Management ultimately outmaneuvered them, acquiring the shipyard in 2022. The outcome was strategic as much as financial: By blocking Chinese ownership, Washington and its allies ensured Subic Bay remained aligned with their own security interests. Today, the Agila yard hosts a mix of tenants, from the Philippine Navy to US defense firms, and is positioning itself as a hub for both naval and commercial shipbuilding.
The US Navy’s planned warehouse fits neatly into this evolving ecosystem. Subic Bay is no longer envisioned as a giant forward-operating base bristling with platforms and weaponry, but as a flexible logistics node supporting a distributed US presence across the Indo-Pacific. This shift reflects broader changes in American strategy. Instead of concentrating forces in a few large, vulnerable bases, Washington is dispersing them across multiple sites, often in cooperation with allies, to complicate Chinese targeting and ensure resilience in a crisis. Subic Bay’s location and infrastructure make it ideal for this role.
For the Philippines, the revival of Subic Bay is equally significant. Manila has been pushing forward with its own military modernization, expanding the presence of its Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in the area. Subic Bay provides a ready-made platform for that effort. The bay’s facilities allow the Philippines to host joint exercises, support maritime patrols, and strengthen its ability to respond to Chinese activity in its waters. The growing tempo of US-Philippine cooperation is striking: By 2026, the two nations plan to conduct as many as 500 joint activities, ranging from training missions to complex exercises.
Subic Bay’s transformation also goes beyond logistics and shipbuilding. Plans are underway for what has been described as the world’s largest munitions plant, approved by both US and Philippine officials and designed to serve as a production hub for allied forces. Though separate from the US Navy’s proposed warehouse, the project speaks to the scale of ambition surrounding Subic Bay’s revival. For Washington, it promises secure supply lines in a region where logistics vulnerabilities could be exploited in conflict. For Manila, it represents another step toward defense self-reliance and a modernized military. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has emphasized the plant’s role in building an independent defense posture, while US leaders have pointed to its importance for regional readiness.
Taken together, these developments illustrate how Subic Bay is being woven back into the fabric of Indo-Pacific security strategy. For the United States, the bay offers a way to project presence without recreating the massive, politically sensitive bases of the past. For the Philippines, it provides infrastructure and investment that bolsters national defense at a time of heightened tension. For both, it sends a message to Beijing: Chinese expansion in the South China Sea will not go unchallenged.
Thirty years after US forces lowered the flag at Subic Bay and sailed away, America is returning—not in the same form, but with a strategy attuned to today’s challenges. A single warehouse may not capture the imagination like a battle fleet once did, but it represents something just as consequential: the embedding of Subic Bay once more into the frontline of regional geopolitics. In the contest over the future of the South China Sea, the bay is back, and this time it is part of a wider network of allied strength designed to endure.
Dr. Emma Salisbury is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.