Return of the Gunfighters

By Trevor Phillips-Levine

Missiles do not always guide and fuse, and warheads do not have 100 percent reliability. Someone has yet to develop a counter to a bullet from a gun.

– Anonymous Fighter Pilot

A technology or tactic is never truly obsolete if what replaces it fails to adequately cover what once was. Advanced militaries often focus on competing by introducing more advanced weaponry—going faster, farther, higher, possessing superior sensors and exquisite countermeasures. Pursuing aerial high technology escalates the increasingly untenable impact on finite budgets and timelines. New technology applied to traditional aircraft requires expensive research and development. Simple, non-elegant solutions are overlooked, especially ones from the past, if deemed “obsolete.”

The proliferation of drone systems in combat applications is driving a circular evolution in aerial combat. While the character of air warfare is changing, its fundamental aims and tactics are not. Drones are merely supplanting manned aircraft and offer the return of aerial mass not seen since World War II. Aerial reconnaissance is still required to direct attacks, and one-away-attack drones are modern derivatives of Nazi Germany’s V1. Until recently, aerial combat trends suggested close-range dogfighting was approaching obsolescence. Now, the aerial dogfight will live well into a drone future: not because missiles are ineffective nor the fighters that carry them, but because drones exploit a domain that technology has advanced beyond and left uncovered. The best defense may very well be relearning and incorporating the low-technology solutions of the past.

The Exposed Part of the Aerial Domain (Air Littoral)

The enduring purpose of airpower is the interdiction of enemy air or surface assets before they can be brought to bear against friendly forces. Airpower can also accurately assess the battlefield, ranging far beyond surface units and enabling successful surface action. In other words, “it secures the freedom of maneuver.” The gap between the airspace where high-altitude modern aircraft and low-altitude proliferated drone systems operate has been termed the “air littoral.” However, exploitation of the low-altitude domain in aerial warfare always existed. As technology matured, aircraft were naturally built to go higher and faster. There, the thinner atmosphere improved range and speed. Flying low incurred vulnerability to being pounced on from above, where the enemy could exploit the sun and rear-facing blind spots, known as the “boom and zoom.” Higher altitudes had other advantages, like placing aircraft beyond the range of most anti-aircraft weapons. But flying low-altitude, or in the “dirt,” could still yield advantages too: namely better target discrimination and perhaps cruising low enough to not be seen by high-flying enemy aircraft or targeted by anti-aircraft systems.

At the dawn of the missile age, radars began to augment human eyesight for aircraft acquisition. Today, modern fighter aircraft are designed for high-altitude combat with radars capable of identifying other aircraft hundreds of miles away. Their radars were optimized for high-intensity aerial combat, with aircraft and missiles flying beyond the speed of sound. Missiles were best employed from high speed and high altitude to squeeze out every ounce of kinematic advantage and destroy an enemy before being seen, known as beyond-visual-range. Low-altitude tactics became a niche skill, mainly used for avoiding highly advanced surface-based anti-aircraft systems. Still, the preferred way of war shifted to destruction or suppression from altitude with standoff weapons to neutralize deadly surface-to-air missile systems. Meanwhile, the low-altitude arena lay mostly abandoned, if not forgotten.

Unable to resource advanced aerial capabilities or contest them, actors of less capability looked to aerial asymmetry. It did not take long for adversaries worldwide to notice that the slow, low-altitude arena lay unguarded. The prevailing assumption is that higher technology is better in all respects. In reality, it represents a trade-off. Faster aircraft meant stronger and lighter airframes, primarily achieved through alloys that reflect radar well without mitigation. Cheaper materials like fiberglass can be used for less demanding, slower airframes and are not as reflective. Radars must lower their velocity gate or “notch” threshold to detect slow targets. Reducing the notch velocity increases background clutter, making it more time-consuming and difficult to find a target out of the noise, a bad trait if closing at supersonic speeds. Finally, if a modern jet is able to find a slow-moving drone, the speed disparity between the two makes a successful interception dubious.

Drones are Surrogates for Traditional Weapon Systems

With readily available commercial electronics, it is no surprise that the weapon of choice for countries like Russia and Iran or terrorists and insurgents worldwide is a comparatively cheap drone to contest an advanced adversary. However, it should be noted that drones are not revolutionizing air warfare as much as they are surrogates for traditional platforms. Drones execute the same missions as traditional aircraft: reconnaissance and strike. One-way attack and explosive first-person-view drones are derivatives of guided missiles. “Spotter” drones are the reconnaissance variants equipped with more capable optics to locate and identify targets and then pass on this information to artillery or strike drone units. As with conventional cruise missiles, some drones are being used for high-risk missions to range deep into contested enemy airspace, and the deeper the target, the larger the drone must become to house the necessary fuel. Where the need to eliminate reconnaissance aircraft forced the first dogfights, so have reconnaissance drones forced the first drone versus drone combat.

American military leaders have expressed alarm at their apparent unpreparedness and the speed at which their expensive missile stockpiles are exchanged against aerial threats that are close to forty times cheaper and faster to procure. But there is a precedent in history for this type of cost exchange. History is replete with examples of exploitation of unguarded air domains. The Japanese Kamikaze, London’s defense against the V1, and North Korea’s “Bed Check Charlie” provide the best lessons for dealing with asymmetric aerial threats and make a strong case for the return of gunfighting aircraft, manned or otherwise.

Lessons from Kamikazes

The Kamikaze surprised the US Navy. Flight controls were blown off diving aircraft by vicious anti-aircraft fire, but Kamikaze pilots continued to press their attacks. A terrifying weapon, a Kamikaze attack only resulted in two outcomes: It was successfully intercepted and shot down by air defenses, or it found its mark with a fiery explosion. The Kamikaze proved a difficult foe, adept at exploiting weaknesses in command and control and radar coverage. For example, Kamikazes attacking as singles from different directions presented smaller radar targets and were much more difficult to defend against than a massed formation.

The US Navy rapidly evolved tactics and modified fleet formations to improve defenses. Importantly, the number of defensive pickets was increased and pushed away from high-value aircraft carriers, aerial cover was provided over the picket ships, and proximity-fused anti-aircraft rounds were developed. Airborne early-warning radar was also introduced and integrated into the fleet defense to eliminate blind spots. The battles that occurred over fleets heralded the arrival of the missile age. The attacks demonstrated the shortcomings of point defense alone and the need for defensive combat air patrols away from the fleet. Pickets and their air cover eroded the combat power of an attack wave, making any remaining enemy easier for ships’ point defenses to deal with. It also marked the pinnacle of the gun-based-only fleet defense before the arrival of anti-aircraft missiles.

Today, the term Kamikaze is sometimes used synonymously with one-way-attack or suicide drones. Suicide drone weapon systems are functionally identical to traditional cruise missile types but usually represent lower values in terms of costs, complexity, and capabilities like speed. One-way-attack drones like the Shahed-136 or Geran-2 in Russian service cruise around 115 miles per hour, or roughly the speed of a Cessna 152 and one-fifth the speed of contemporary jet fighters or subsonic cruise missiles. As with any cruise missile, its primary objective is to penetrate air defenses and conduct deep strike. The Kamikaze taught the US Navy that to defend against such a threat, interception further from the defended assets was necessary and defensive air cover essential. Interception further from the fleet allowed for an earlier erosion of the attack wave’s combat power and a chance at disruption before unpredictable circuitous routes could be executed.

Britain’s defense against Hitler’s V1 flying bomb aligns with the US Navy’s lessons for layered defenses against Kamikazes and the need to intercept as many of them as far as possible from the defended entity. To contend with the V1, Britain stationed fighter caps over the channel to identify the missiles as they approached. Air defense artillery and barrage balloons were employed as point defense measures for the missiles that made it past the fighters. In total, Britain was successful in downing 3,500 of the 6,725 V1s launched.

The recent use of Navy and shore-based aircraft to protect shipping in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks bears hallmarks of these defensive tactics. However, there is consternation in the government and amongst casual observers regarding the cost of the defense versus the threat. Most shootdowns have been conducted with expensive missiles from ships or fighter jets. The AIM-9X, the preferred missile used in fighter air-to-air engagements, costs about $399,000 each, while ship-based anti-air missiles run more than $2 million. This is compared to propeller attack drones that likely cost around $50,000 and can be intercepted by helicopter door guns. An even bigger factor is the drawdown of capable weaponry that the current industrial base cannot readily replace.

Bed Check Charlie

Until the fatal drone attack on Tower 22 in 2024, a US base on the Jordanian-Syrian border, the last time a US soldier was killed in an aerial attack was in 1953 during the Korean War. Unable to compete with the technologically and numerically superior US aircraft, the North Korean military sought asymmetric ways to attack US positions. Using obsolete aircraft from the Second World War and before, North Korean propeller aircraft penetrated US air defense perimeters under the cover of darkness and conducted harassment missions.

Flying at low altitudes and speeds much slower than contemporary jet aircraft, US fighters experienced great difficulty downing these North Korean aircraft, known as “Bed Check Charlie.” In fact, several crashes and mid-airs occurred attempting to match speed with North Korean aircraft. “Bed Check Charlie” exploited a portion of the air domain that technology had advanced beyond and had left uncovered. It was not until the reactivation of Second World War propeller night fighters equipped with radar that the Bed Check Charlie threat was finally neutralized.

Return of the Gunfighters

A recent deployment of an Army unit to the Middle East saw over 170 drone attacks between August 2023 and April 2024. Of the 115 defensive shootdowns, ninety-three were attributed to guns and missiles. Of those ninety-three, most were credited to the land Phalanx system, a radar-directed twenty-millimeter Gatling gun found in fighter jets and close-in weapons systems aboard ships. Ukraine is further evidence of the effectiveness of ground gun systems like Germany’s twin-barreled Gepard, which was used successfully to intercept Russian drones and cruise missiles.

As with any surface-based system, the drawback is that their sensing and range are constrained by terrain and the radar horizon, which often limits the primary advantage of longer-range missiles. In many cases, gun systems were employed because identification of the threat did not occur in time for a missile engagement at range. The previously mentioned Army unit stated they had anywhere from thirty seconds to one minute to identify a threat once it was sighted. While the US Army unit endured 170 attacks over eight months, Ukraine weathered eighty-nine one-way attack drones targeting its infrastructure in one night. Such an attack on a small Army outpost would likely overwhelm its point defense systems. Ukraine was successful in shooting all the drones down in this attack because it had a layered defense with aircraft, and these attacks were attempts to strike deep into the country. Ukraine established forward observation posts and radar sites that served as pickets, and its aircraft were far enough away from the frontlines to be safe while prosecuting the incoming drones. Ukraine has mostly used its fighter aircraft to intercept these slow, low-flying munitions, as does the United States, but is that the most effective use of fighter jets in a protracted war, especially when defending the interior of a country that is free of most threat anti-air systems?

The Low-End Air Force

In early summer, Russian social media channels began to complain about the success of a Ukrainian Yak-52 in downing their reconnaissance Zala and Orlan drones. Built as a trainer, Ukraine’s Yak-52 became an accidental gunfighter with a pilot in the front and a shotgun-toting gunner in the back. Since Russia’s reconnaissance drones are not known to maneuver aggressively and fly predictable headings, a slow propeller-driven airplane that can fly within shotgun range proved very effective. While Russia is preoccupied with locating Ukrainian targets in rear areas, the airspace, especially at lower altitudes where these drones were operating, was safe enough for a propeller-driven aircraft to operate.

Troops near the frontlines usually do not benefit from dedicated air cover unless provided by other drones because of the proximity to threat anti-air systems that make it dangerous for traditional manned aircraft. For now, it appears that Ukrainian operators are content with trying to ram encountered enemy drones with theirs. A few successful intercepts by Ukrainian drones were published, but the effort requires much piloting skill. But why not blast an enemy drone from the sky and return your drone to fight another day? On his Twitter account, Marine Colonel Travis Hord, an authority on infantry drone systems, suggested that Marines should consider arming their drones for counter-drone defense with a shotgun round. What if a drone could loiter and make multiple gun passes from close range versus ramming?

Gun-equipped drones and propeller aircraft are attractive for a few reasons. Propeller aircraft offer longer endurance, can keep pace with slower threats, and can operate from shorter airstrips or stretches of road. Crewed aircraft typically have more battlefield awareness and pilots could make quick work of a larger long-range drone with onboard guns. Even with missile technology advancing, aerial gun kills did not lose favor until after Vietnam. Guns also offer plural utility and can be used in the prosecution of ground targets.

Bullets are manufactured in much greater quantities and are easier to transport in a war zone, especially when aircraft use guns that utilize the same ammunition as nearby troops. Missiles are comparatively expensive and lengthen the kill chain as it is another complex guidance unit that must work in tandem. They also require manufacturing expertise and significant logistics to reach the point of use. If some aerial interceptions of drones occur at short range and the drones have limited ability to maneuver or detect an approaching threat, why not default to a cheaper and more abundant munition to down them?

The main drawback with gun systems, especially in manned aircraft, is the perceived difficulty with accurate aiming. This difficulty is compounded by the size of typical enemy drones, which are usually far smaller than any manned aircraft. Guided anti-drone systems like the Coyote or Roadrunner could be configured as cheap missile alternatives to complement aircraft load-outs to increase the likelihood of a successful intercept, especially at night when visual aiming is nearly impossible. Vision enhancement systems, radar gunsights, and autonomy features in guided systems will likely improve effectiveness and accuracy.

The Future

It is apparent that the “air littoral” must be recovered, and the best way to ensure it stays covered is to field a mixture of armed drones and propeller or rotary-wing aircraft. Long-range attack drones like Yemen’s Samad or Iran’s Shahed are typically large enough to be prosecuted by manned aircraft. With long loiter times and the ability to comfortably keep pace, using lower-end aircraft to prosecute low and slow targets in the age of jets was proven in Korea. Armed counter-air drones will be required to cover forward positions where airspace is too contested, and as the number of drones increases over the battlefield, the ability for a drone to shoot down multiple will become a necessity. For these aircraft to be effective, they must be mated to radars optimized for detecting drones and thermal sights, as attacks will occur at night and inclement weather.

The Navy and the Air Force will likely oppose creating and fielding a lower-end air arm. The Air Force abandoned its light attack program in 2022 after purchasing only five propeller-driven aircraft for ground attack, a program that was supposed to purchase up to 300 aircraft. The Air Force announced interest in a light jet fighter concept shortly after leaving the light attack program, leaving some to speculate that the Air Force was being parochial in favoring jet fighters over ground support. The Navy experimented with OV-10s in Combat Dragon II against the Islamic State before leaving the program, despite its success. Besides competing with existing priorities, leaders likely did not see a use case for propeller attack aircraft beyond insurgency use and were worried about the proliferation of advanced anti-air weaponry reducing their effectiveness. Some insiders quietly opined that the real reason was to preserve the current manned jet enterprise. Perhaps leaders will now recognize necessity over parochial interests. Or will the Pentagon and industry persist in chasing costly or unnecessarily complex, time-consuming high-tech solutions, disregarding historical lessons?

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Trevor Phillips-Levine is a US naval aviator and part of a nascent group of Navy professionals in joint fires. He served in Naval Special Warfare, the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center, and as an advisor for weaponized small drone development in a cooperative research and development agreement and the Defense Innovation Unit. These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of any US government department or agency.