Return of the Dead: Why INF-Range Missiles in Europe are a Good Thing
By Fabian Hoffmann
In a joint statement on July 10, 2024, the United States and Germany announced that the United States will start deploying new missile systems to Europe. These missile systems include Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles deployed on the Typhon ground-based transporter erector launcher, as well as the Dark Eagle hypersonic weapon system.
The catch: These missile systems fall under the category previously banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty prohibited the deployment of ground-based missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km in Europe, regardless of payload (nuclear or conventional). Intermediate-range missiles were seen as particularly destabilizing due to their short warning time, rendering them ideal to conduct nuclear surprise attacks. The Treaty was in force from 1988 until 2019, when the United States withdrew due to Russia’s development and deployment of the SSC-8 Screwdriver, a land-based medium-range cruise missile.
The deployment of formerly banned missiles has raised concerns, particularly in Germany, which will host the first set of INF-range missiles. These concerns center primarily around two points:
The deployment of INF-range missiles in Germany will prompt a new arms race with Russia.
The deployment of INF-range missiles in Germany increases risks of escalation between NATO and Russia.
I believe that these concerns have been overstated. In addition, I argue that the deployment of INF-range missiles to Europe is highly advantageous. It provides NATO with capabilities previously unavailable in the European theater and restores NATO's (and Germany’s) role as a credible actor in the region and beyond.
Restoring capability and credibility
The increased range of the missile systems deployed to Germany will allow NATO to threaten Russian targets that so far remain relatively invulnerable. Especially the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system, which boasts a range of up to 1,750 miles (2,800 km), provides for the ability to conduct strikes deep inside Russia. This creates new opportunities to disrupt Russian logistics and destroy its warfighting capacity to slow down and push back a Russian advance on NATO’s frontline states, should Moscow make the decision to expand its war in Ukraine and invade NATO territory. At the same time, it allows NATO to threaten a greater number of symbolically, economically, and politically important targets to deter and retaliate against Russian missile strikes on critical civilian infrastructure, similar to what we are currently seeing in Ukraine.
More importantly, Dark Eagle and SM-6 (employed in surface-to-surface mode) will enable NATO to engage time-sensitive targets at operational and strategic depth, a capability currently absent in European missile arsenals. Existing subsonic air and surface-launched cruise missiles in European stocks are too slow, while rocket artillery and short-range ballistic missiles often lack the necessary range. Dark Eagle and SM-6 not only offer significantly improved range but also reach their targets within minutes of launch. This will complicate Russian military planning and reinforce NATO’s deterrence posture.
Politically, the move helps restore the United States and NATO’s credibility on the international arms control stage vis-à-vis both Moscow and Beijing. What message does it send that NATO has adhered to a defunct treaty for over five years while Russia has deployed INF-range weapons for more than a decade, potentially even using the SSC-8 Screwdriver system in Ukraine – the very weapon that killed the INF treaty? Russia’s decision to choose non-compliance must have consequences, and the United States and NATO’s decision to finally put an end to unilateral compliance with a defunct treaty was overdue. Returning to the pre-INF status quo underscores that arms control with NATO is a two-way street, and that non-compliance will be punished. This can only be helpful in future arms control negotiations with Russia and China, if and when opportunities arise.
For Germany, the move helps restore some credibility and trust with NATO allies that has been lost in recent months, due to its reluctance to provide long-range strike capabilities to Ukraine, a move that is seen as undermining European security by its Eastern European allies. Facilitating the deployment of missile capabilities critical for European security, especially without a lengthy and cumbersome domestic debate, will reassure allies that Germany remains committed to their defense and accepts a leading role in deterring Russia.
Arms Race and Escalation Risks
Since the announcement of the planned deployment, several analysts have cautioned that his move will result in a costly and inefficient arms race where everyone is set to lose. In addition, analysts have argued that this move will increase the risks of escalation between NATO and Russia in Europe. These risks and associated dangers are overstated, however.
While it is certainly possible and even likely that INF-range weapons will be reintroduced to the European continent in greater numbers in the coming years, none of the involved actors seems particularly motivated or capable to engage in a comprehensive missile arms race. The United States’ missile-related efforts will more than likely remain preoccupied with China and the Indo-Pacific. Russia has a myriad of other military capabilities to prioritize – including in the missile domain – and likely cannot afford to heavily invest in INF-range missiles beyond what it is already doing. European NATO states will likely neither demonstrate the political will nor have the financial capacity to engage in a rapid missile buildup.
In addition, it is important to realize that Russia has arguably more to lose from an arms race in this weapons category than NATO. Existing shorter-range missile systems stationed in Kaliningrad and Belarus can already threaten most European capitals, including with nuclear warheads. Russian INF-range missiles deployed on Russian homeland do not change this. In contrast, most European states do not have the ability to threaten Moscow from their homeland territory at present. The reintroduction of large numbers of INF-range missiles would therefore impose greater costs on Russia than NATO. If Russia wants to arms race, so be it.
Looking at escalation risks, more than anything, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that decisionmakers escalate wars, not weapon systems. While the ability to rapidly engage targets deep behind the frontline in principle provides for escalatory potential, there is no automaticity that INF-range missiles will escalate the NATO-Russia relationship.
On the contrary: the best way to prevent conflict escalation remains preventing the outbreak of war in the first place. As outlined above, INF-range missiles provide NATO with new military options that help convince Russia that challenging NATO Article 5 is a bad idea. In addition, a credible counterstrike capability, including against high-value targets deep inside Russia, constitutes a powerful intra-war deterrent that can make Russian decisionmakers reconsider taking escalatory steps, including after hostilities have broken out.
The Way Forward
The return of INF-range missiles to European NATO states is essentially about rectifying the pay-off matrix in a cooperation game. Instead of having Russia accrue all the benefits of Russian non-compliance, NATO now chooses to share the costs of non-compliance by building up its own INF-range capabilities. The new status quo leaves both parties worse off than if they had mutually complied with the treaty, but it improves NATO’s relative position compared to before, when only Russia deployed INF-range missiles in Europe.
If NATO’s relationship with Russia fundamentally changes, and European cooperative security once again becomes an option, new treaty instruments might be considered. However, NATO should no longer accept a state of asymmetrical vulnerability, where European capitals and homeland targets are minutes away from a Russian missile strike from Kaliningrad, while European NATO states lack the ability to respond in kind. If Russia and NATO return to negotiating over missiles in Europe, Russian shorter-range missile capabilities stationed in Kaliningrad (and Belarus) must also be addressed. Until then, rearming in the missile domain remains NATO’s best option in Europe to guarantee its security and status as a credible actor.
Fabian Hoffmann is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP). His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy and defense policy. His PhD project addresses the implications of conventional long-range strike weapons on nuclear strategy. His research has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, War on the Rocks, and The Washington Post, among others.