The Air Force’s Missile Woes

The Sentinel program has stumbled, but it’s not down for the count

It is hard being an Air Force missileer. You spend years on crew in the frozen north, working with communications and electronic equipment that is decades older than you. For the past twenty years, airmen flying planes have been very busy fighting in conflicts overseas while you sit on watch in the United States. For years, you had to put up with taking proficiency tests that demanded 100 percent correct answers or your career was in peril. Nursing these Minuteman missiles took teams of maintenance crews, security forces, facility managers, and chefs working long hours to maintain the 50-year old missiles and launch control centers. The Obama administration sparked a glimmer of hope that, in its proposed nuclear modernization plan, there just might be a shiny, new missile in the near future. Then you find out that a number of your missileer colleagues have come down with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma during their career. What else could possibly go wrong? 

Well, the Department of Defense could always cancel the Air Force’s Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program and leave you with the current state of aging missiles and twentieth century communications. The Sentinel program has come under fire as its costs rose, and schedule slipped. This triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach, which is a piece of congressional legislation meant to force a review of major acquisition defense programs that increased its costs by 25 percent or more over its baseline. In 2020, The Department of Defense estimated that the Sentinel program would cost around $95 billion to develop and produce. This was supposed to include a replacement of all the launch control centers as well as new silos. In 2024, new estimates placed the total program cost at $141 billion and slip the fielding schedule from 2036 to 2039. The DoD leadership identified unpredicted costs associated with the ground infrastructure as the problem, a fault shared by the contractor Northrup Grumman as well as the Air Force leadership.

The DoD leadership announced that it had conducted its review and will restructure the Sentinel program to try to reduce costs. The Air Force fired the program manager and has to figure out how to move $45 billion from other Air Force programs to “fix” the Sentinel program. Meanwhile, Congress faces the decision as to whether to approve the continued development of this nuclear missile. But let’s be serious, the program isn’t in peril, despite the glaring faults. Most of the cost growth is more than five years away, so it’s easy to kick the hard decisions on cost reallocation down the road. The unanticipated cost growth and schedule slip is a black eye for the Air Force leadership, but it’s nothing that will stop its eventual deployment in ten years or so. Nuclear deterrence is a deep and complicated topic, but the issue at the root of the Sentinel is not dissimilar than any other major defense acquisition program. Every defense system that ages out gets replaced by an upgrade. This one, however, is special, given the nature of its mission.

Policy Makers Want the Sentinel

One of the more reoccurring questions is why does the United States need intercontinental ballistic missiles at all? The argument for relying solely on strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines to deter a possible Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear attack has been going around for years.  Some will argue that it is historical inertia or a lack of imagination that causes policy makers to insist on retaining ground-based ballistic missiles within a strategic triad, but there is a good rationale for this position. One point is that investing in three different delivery systems allows for a hedge against technical problems in any one system or vulnerabilities. For instance, there are two submarine bases and three air bases that host military platforms that can host nuclear weapons. By maintaining 400 ballistic missile silos, the U.S. government forces its adversaries to fully commit their arsenals to defeating all these facilities. Congress called for Nuclear Posture Reviews so that the White House would explain the rationale for this position.

One could argue that the United States should engage Russia and China in arms control discussions to lower the number of strategic nuclear forces, committing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to show good faith to complete disarmament. Certainly this remains a strong desire to continue these discussions with nuclear-armed adversaries. There are two challenges here; first, both Russia and China rely on ballistic missiles for strategic stability against rivals other than the United States. They have no interest in eliminating ballistic missiles as part of their posture. Second, both Russia and China have not shown any interest in engaging the United States in any arms control discussions relating to strategic or tactical nuclear weapons.

There are certainly alternatives to continuing to develop the Sentinel missile. Stephen Cimbala and Lawrence Korb suggest that one could continue relying on the aging Minuteman III missile, move to a strategic dyad, develop road- or rail-mobile ballistic missiles, or put conventional warheads on the missiles. There’s always the option to have a smaller nuclear triad. Policy makers must make a decision that maintains a posture of strategic stability against Russian and Chinese nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines (yes, they have strategic triads also) and that is affordable in the grand context of national security. The operators will tell you that they would like to be able to offer the President options to deter and defeat a nuclear-armed adversary in any future scenario. The triad offers those options and forces the adversary to reconsider using these weapons.

The Operators Want the Sentinel

Senior policy makers have often stressed the importance of the Department of Defense nuclear enterprise. In 2016, while visiting Minot Air Force Base, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said “America’s nuclear deterrence is the bedrock of our security and the highest priority of the Department of Defense. It’s a mission that demands unparalleled excellence; excellence that you define. We count on you for that.” The Department of Defense and Department of Energy often say that their mission is to develop nuclear capabilities that are “safe, secure, and reliable.” The reliability aspect is significantly important, as U.S. policy makers expect that nuclear weapons will always work when authorized and never go off when they are not authorized. Maintaining a 50-year-old system with parts that don’t exist in commercial industry and relying on a twentieth century communications system in an age of cyber operations is not a good picture.[i]

Admiral Charles Richard, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said in 2021 that “you cannot life-extend the Minuteman III [any longer].” This is in reference to the suggestion that extending the lives of the existing missile would be a cost-saving measure, in as much as it would eliminate the research and development dollars associated with Sentinel and allow the Air Force to continue its deterrence mission with Minutemen. General Timothy Ray, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, echoed this concern in 2021 that “we’re just going to run out of time” due to disappearing sources for parts, “the complexity of threats,” and the challenges in maintaining an aging ballistic missile that was intended to be operated for only 10 years. This is not to mention the poor condition of launch control centers that airmen have in which to operate the system. It should be a given that airmen have a safe operating space to perform what defense leaders call the department’s highest priority mission.

Based on a review of the Sentinel program, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LePlante announced in July 2024 that the program would go forward, but not without significant restructuring. He stated, “Based on the results of the review, it is clear that a reasonably modified Sentinel program remains essential to U.S. national security and is the best option to meet the needs of the warfighter.” The Air Force acquisition community and budget planners aren’t happy about the significant cost increases, but this isn’t exactly the first time that a major defense acquisition program has slipped cost and schedule and it won’t be the last. Until Congress gets serious about defense acquisition reform, slips like this will likely continue.

Northrup Grumman was awarded a $13.3 billion contract to start its engineering and manufacturing development of the Sentinel in 2020. Air Force Global Strike Command has started construction and modification of facilities and infrastructure at its missile bases. The money is in place, and no one is going to pull out given the sunk costs and time involved. And if you think this is grim news, take a peek at the Navy’s development of its Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, whose cost growth and schedule slips mirror those of the Sentinel.

Congress Wants the Sentinel

It doesn’t matter what the Defense Department wants if Congress doesn’t approve the funding for its military research, development, and acquisition. With regards to nuclear weapons, Congress has gone back and forth on modernizing U.S. forces, but Congress did call for a plan to sustain and modernize the Minuteman III in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. As part of getting the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty through the Senate, President Barack Obama had to promise to budget a significant modernization effort to revitalize all three legs of the strategic triad and Department of Energy infrastructure. Since then, there has been a steady debate on both sides of the issue as to how the U.S. nuclear posture should be developed and maintained.

We must take a nuanced view of Congress. There are congressional hearings that allow for public speeches and rhetorical flourish on nuclear weapons issues. And then there’s what really counts, what the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Appropriations Committees put in their legislation for military budgets. There are representatives in the House and Senate who think that funding the Sentinel is a waste of money. Sen. Edward Markey (D-Mass) said “Historically, nations have collapsed by overspending on outdated defense strategies, and I fear the United States is repeating these mistakes. Each year, we approve increased spending without ensuring it enhances stability and security. These programs are unnecessary and costly mistakes at the expense of the U.S. taxpayer and further precipitate the modern nuclear arms race between the U.S., Russia, and China.” Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA) said “It is the height of irresponsibility to continue pouring money into such programs when cheaper and similarly effective alternatives exist. Anyone who has real concerns about our fiscal trajectory or entering a dangerous new nuclear arms race should object to these provisions and support additional oversight of our nuclear weapons programs.”

On the other side, many congress members voice their support for the Sentinel, to include the Senate ICBM Coalition. Sen. John Tester (D-MT) said “The folks at Malmstrom are counting on Congress to put aside division and partisan politics, and provide the resources they need to do their jobs and safeguard our national security. As Defense Chairman, I will be working with partners on both sides of the aisle and in the administration to ensure that the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program [now called the Sentinel] stays on track so that we maintain a reliable strategic nuclear deterrent for decades to come.” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) said “Sentinel is absolutely necessary for the future of our nuclear deterrent. I'm committed to conducting vigorous oversight of the program and ensuring the Air Force follows through on making the necessary changes to address the cost overruns while continuing to advance the program. The Department must ensure that Sentinel is ready in time to replace the current ICBMs before they reach the end of their lives.” 

Congress has a strong bipartisan position on continuing the modernization of the Air Force’s ballistic missile force, but at the same time, its members expect the Department of Defense and Department of Energy managers to do this in a responsible fiscal manner. They will put up with incremental cost increases as long as the overall modernization effort stays on track. And they get very informed reports from the CRS and GAO in an effort to be prepared to ask the right questions.

The Commissions want the Sentinel

It’s not hard to find Think tanks in Washington, DC talking about nuclear weapons, given the high level of interest in this topic by the national security community.. Recently though, several political moderates have joined conservatives in supporting this modernization effort.

The Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was a bipartisan group of twelve former defense officials, politicians, and well-known pundits who were supposed to review the United States’ defense strategy and posture against China and Russia. Its report came out in October 2023. It had several recommendations that urged modifications to the U.S. nuclear force posture to include the replacement of all U.S. nuclear delivery systems and modernization of their warheads. It not only recommended the swift execution of the Sentinel program, it called for putting multiple nuclear warheads on each missile (currently the Minuteman III has only one) and to “pursue the feasibility of fielding some portion of the future ICBM force in a road mobile configuration.”

The Commission on National Defense Strategy was a similar bipartisan group of eight individuals with a long history of working national security issues. Their task was to review the 2022 National Defense Strategy and offer recommendations to Congress. The report was completed in August 2024, stressing the nuclear capabilities of Russia, China, and North Korea. This commission shared the Strategic Posture Commission’s findings that there was a “need to enhance missile defense for the homeland and modernize all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad.” They also stated that it “supports fully funding nuclear modernization [to include the Sentinel] but also ensuring that these efforts do not come at the expense of modernizing and expanding the Navy and Air Force conventional forces.” 

The value of these independent commissions, both with experienced directors and staff with strong arguments, is to influence the government as well as the general public. Their arguments lack a critical component, which is the budget aspects – who pays for all of this? They don’t want to address that point, because they know the answer is going to be controversial and they’d rather let the government (both executive and legislative) take on that burden. As a result, their proposals may lack the dedicated resources to become reality.

Concluding Thoughts

This argument is not meant to make the reader a believer in nuclear deterrence. Rather, one should understand that modernizing nuclear ballistic missiles isn’t just a case of the Air Force instinctively trying to hold onto its budget and mission, as some critics suggest. At the same time, the critics and advocates for nuclear modernization have extreme views. The answer isn’t zero ballistic missiles and it isn’t 1500 ballistic missiles. There must be a balance between budget, practicality, and national security priorities. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said it best.

[T]he United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them.

We’ve been there. We’ve learned that lesson.

Nor does the United States need to deploy ever-more dangerous nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence.

Rather, effective deterrence means that we have a “better” approach—not a “more” approach.

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[i] For instance, Kansas City Nuclear Security Complex states that more than 80 percent of all non-nuclear components come from their plant, as opposed to industry sources. Sandia National Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base develops the nuclear components for nearly all nuclear weapon systems.

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Al Mauroni is the former director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of eight books, the latest being “BIOCRISIS: Defining Biological Threats in U.S. Policy.” He has nearly 40 years of experience in Department of Defense countering weapons of mass destruction policy and program development. Previously he worked for the Headquarters Air Force, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Army.